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Abstract
With the proliferation of mobile devices, location-based services (LBS) have penetrated into our daily life in recent years. In an
LBS system, the users check in at diﬀerent venues to acquire rewards such as virtual points or real-world coupons/discounts,
and easily share with their friends the recent activities. While these rewards beneﬁt benign users a lot, they are incentives for
malicious users to cheat on their locations. Recent researches have revealed that location cheating can be launched automatically
on a large scale at ease. In current practice, the defense against location cheating relies on the server side solution, which has
been proven to be insuﬃcient. In this paper, we propose a novel veriﬁcation system named WiLoVe. It maps the physical
area of a venue to the local WiFi coverage and involves the venue owner as the veriﬁer, hence utilizes the user’s capability of
one-hop communication with the veriﬁer to verify the user’s presence at the venue. In this work, we implement the veriﬁer as an
independent application, which can easily be installed on the venue owner’s existing devices (laptops, cellphones, etc.). Hence,
no additional hardware is needed. An adaptive algorithm is designed to defend against proxy attacks based on the check-in
delay. Extensive experiments show that WiLoVe achieves low false rate, as well as consistent user experience, acceptable
power consumption, and good applicability to diﬀerent WiFi environments.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki.
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1. Introduction
Mobile devices (smart phones, tablets, etc.) already become a must-have for people all around the world.
Versatile sensors featured in these devices give birth to a lot of context-aware applications (later on we use “apps”
for simplicity), among which the location-based service (LBS) is a famous example. A recent report shows that
74% of smartphone owners use their phones to get location-based information, and 18% use LBSes to check in
to certain locations or share their locations with friends1. LBSes not only bring convenience to the user’s daily
life, but also provide real world beneﬁts such as coupons and discounts. Unfortunately, these beneﬁts are also
incentives for malicious users to abuse LBS and cheat on their locations. For example, in Foursquare, the most
popular check-in app up to date2, a user can easily check in to a venue (e.g., book stores, restaurants, shopping
malls, etc.) to acquire the coupon without physically visiting the venue, or impress their friends by frequently
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checking in to any desired place (e.g. gyms) while relaxing at home. These behaviors claiming a fake location is
called location cheating. It goes against both the rules and spirit of LBS systems, and leads to unfairness in the
LBS community. Without a proper scheme to detect or prevent location cheating, the LBS system may be used
other than the way they are supposed to.
In practice, the defense against location cheating relies on the server side solution. Foursquare adopts the
“cheater code” to detect location cheating by examining if a user’s movement (according to the user’s check-in
record) violates the human speed limitation. For example, it is impossible for a user to visit two places which
are thousands of miles apart within minutes. However, The “cheater code” has been proven to be insuﬃcient3.
Moreover, it has been revealed that attackers can easily conduct bot check-ins to target locations and bypass the
server’s inspection. Therefore, a practical and eﬃcient location veriﬁcation system is in great demand to securely
verify the user’s real location and prevent bot check-ins from attackers.
A good location veriﬁcation system must meet the following requirements:
• Accuracy.The location veriﬁcation system should be able to detect location cheating with both small false
negative rate (FNR) and false positive rate (FPR), i.e., most of the cheaters should be detected and an honest
user should be unaﬀected.
• Cost Eﬃciency. The location veriﬁcation system should utilize existing infrastructure or oﬀ-the-shelf hard-
ware. The design that requires additional hardware or hacking the existing hardware will be less practical.
• Transparency. The veriﬁcation process should be automatic and require little or no eﬀort from the users, so
that techniques like challenging a user with in situ questions are ruled out. The location veriﬁcation should
rely only on the physical presence of the user at the claimed location.
• Scalability. Due to the large population of LBS users, the location veriﬁcation must be lightweight to
accommodate a large number of location veriﬁcation requests in current LBS systems.
In this paper, we propose an on-site location veriﬁcation system called WiLoVe. Taking advantage of the limited
communication range of WiFi routers which are owned by individual venues, WiLoVe involves the venue owner
as the local veriﬁer and carries out a local veriﬁcation process through interactions between the venue owner and
the user. This process ensures that only when the users are within the WiFi coverage of the routers in the claimed
location, can they exchange messages with the venue owner and complete the location veriﬁcation. However, a
malicious user may issue a proxy attack, by ﬁnding a proxy device placed around the target venue, then utilize the
proxy to relay messages and pretend as if the attacker is nearby. Thereby, we adopt delay analysis executed at the
venue side to detect proxy attacks.
The contributions of this paper are three-fold:
• We propose a practical location veriﬁcation scheme by mapping the venue area to local WiFi coverage.
• We implement a mock-up location veriﬁcation system WiLoVe. The veriﬁer is introduced and implemented
as a separate app which could be installed on a laptop or mobile devices and no additional hardware is
required.
• We conduct comprehensive evaluations and prove the validity of this system. We show that WiLoVe achieves
a performance with FPR=1.49% and FNR=4.14%, without loss of applicability to diﬀerent WiFi environ-
ments, while keeping consistent user experience and reasonable power consumption.
This paper is organized as follows: First, we describe the system design of WiLoVe in Section 2; In Section 3 we
elaborate upon the implementation and evaluate its eﬃciency and eﬃcacy against fake check-ins, as well as the
user experience and power consumption; In Section 4 we summarize the related work and ﬁnally in Section 5, we
conclude the paper and discuss the future work.
2. Design of WiLoVe
2.1. System Design
By involving the venue owner as a local veriﬁer, the system architecture transforms from a client-server struc-
ture in existing LBS system to the trilateral one in WiLoVe (Fig. 1a). The user operates through a smart phone
while the veriﬁer can use either a mobile device or a computer connected to local WiFi access point (AP).
Built on top of the basic check-in ﬂow in the existing LBS (Fig. 2), WiLoVe’s work ﬂow involves the following
modiﬁcations. 1. The user and the veriﬁer each generate an asymmetric key-pair, all the communications are
encrypted using these keys. The server acts as a trusted entity to distribute public keys between them. 2. The
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Fig. 1: Architecture of the veriﬁcation system. (a) Normal check-in scenario. (b) Proxy attack scenario. tWiFi is the round trip delay in the local
WiFi network. t1 and t2 indicate the round trip delay along the corresponding path respectively.
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Fig. 2: The check in process of a typical LBS system
veriﬁer’s WiFi SSID and IP address are included in the venue info and updated to the server. 3. The user can
acquire the SSID and IP of the veriﬁer from the server, and now it sends check-in requests to the veriﬁer instead
of the server; the veriﬁer listens on a predeﬁned port for the check-in requests. 4. The veriﬁer veriﬁes the user
with encrypted messages which are dynamically generated. 5. The time spent on the message decryption and
communication during the veriﬁcation is employed to detect proxy attack.
2.2. Defense Strategies
Against Proxy Attack
In a proxy attack, a proxy device is placed inside the venue area to relay the communication between the attacker
and the veriﬁer (Fig. 1b). In this case, the attacker can pretend to be in the coverage of the venue WiFi.
One observation of the proxy attack is that it inevitably brings in extra communication delay. WiLoVe employs
such delay to distinguish the proxy attack and normal check-ins.
For each check-in, the recorded veriﬁcation delay is
Δt = Treceive − Tsend = tdecryption + tWiFi (1)
Here, Tsend and Treceive are the timestamps of the veriﬁer sending encrypted message to the user and receiving cor-
responding decrypted message from the user, respectively. tWiFi is the round-trip delay in the local WiFi network;
tdecryption is the time used by the user to decrypt the veriﬁcation message.
In the proxy attack scenario (Fig. 1b), the overall delay is
Δtproxy = tdecryption + tWiFi + tp
Here, tp is the round-trip time between the attacker and the proxy. In the work by B. Carbunar and R. Potharaju4,
they claim that Δtproxy is about 12 times higher than Δt. In their case, tdecryption is at an ignorable level, thus tp should
be about 11 times higher than tWiFi. However, our tests show that such distinct diﬀerence does not necessarily exist.
For example, in one of our tests, the attacker is in the same city with the venue, and the average tp is only 1.25
times of tWiFi. Additionally, tp has a large variance, and in many cases the range of tp overlaps with that of tWiFi.
Thus it is not easy to detect if a small tp is added to tWiFi. Based on this observation, we propose an adaptive proxy
detecting algorithm which is simple yet eﬀective. It is based on moving average, as follows:
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1. After recording Tsend and Treceive, compute the delay Δt of current check-in using Eq.1.
2. Each time a new check-in’s delay is recorded, it is compared to current upper bound U, calculated by
U = μ + k ∗ σ (2)
Here, μ is the mean value and σ is the standard deviation of measurements in History; k is a predeﬁned model
parameter, which we will discuss later. If the delay of the newly recorded check-in is larger than U, the check-
in is treated as a potential proxy attack, and the veriﬁer app will generate and encrypt another randommessage,
send it back and record the delay again. This is called a recheck-in. MaxCount sets a limit on the number
of continuous recheck-ins allowed. If the recheck-in still fails even when the maximum limit is reached, this
whole check-in session is treated as a proxy attack. If the delay of the newly recorded check-in/recheck-in is
smaller than the upper bound U, it will be accepted.
3. A FIFO queue called History stores the delays of len recent check-ins. When a check-in session ends, even
if the check-in is accepted, only the delay of the last recheck-in in this session is inserted into History. This
is based on the following two reasons. First, the last recheck-in is the newest one, thus taking it will keep the
freshness of the History queue. Second, for those rejected recheck-ins, if they are not attacks, then their high
delays reﬂect the network ﬂuctuation and should not be recorded; else if they are attacks, they should not be
recorded either, otherwise they will pull up the average the History.
The proxy detecting algorithm is adaptive to the dynamic changes of the network delay for two reasons. First,
History is a FIFO queue that updates over time, thus the mean value μ in Eq. 2 is actually computing the moving
average, which dynamically reﬂects the trend of network delay. Second, the standard deviation σ plugs the latest
network delay information into the upperbound, thus makes it tolerant of short-term ﬂuctuation. In Section 3, we
will show how the parameters, i.e. the length len of History, the maximal allowed recheck-in number MaxCount
and the bound factor k, will aﬀect the system performance against proxy attacks.
Against Replay Attack
In a replay attack, the attacker ﬁrst intercepts and stores the information needed for the veriﬁcation. Then it
poses itself as a normal user to communicate with the veriﬁer, and tries to use the stored information to pass any
further veriﬁcation request. However, the veriﬁcation messages are dynamically generated in WiLoVe, even if the
attacker stores them, they will be invalid in the future check-in sessions. Therefore, WiLoVe can eﬀectively defend
against replay attacks.
Against the “Cold Start” Problem
The proposed proxy detecting method requires to collect historical check-in information. At the beginning,
there is only little or even no user check-ins, it will take an extremely long time for the veriﬁer to collect historical
information. This special case is called the “cold start” problem. We solve it by asking the veriﬁer app to simulate
the veriﬁcation process on its own. That is, it sends check-in request to itself, generates the encrypted dynamic
message, decrypts and sends it back to itself. By doing so, the veriﬁer can estimate tdecryption. This estimation is
reliable because the veriﬁer and the user both use mobile devices which have comparable computational ability.
Then the veriﬁer records the round trip delay of communicating with the local WiFi as tWiFi. To this end, the
veriﬁer manages to estimate Δt and feed it into the History queue. Hence the cold start problem is solved.
3. Evaluation
In this section, we build a mock-up version of WiLoVe, compromising diﬀerent models of android devices.
Then we test the system performance defending against proxy attacks from diﬀerent locations under diﬀerent local
WiFi load conditions. At last, we show how the user experience is aﬀected in WiLoVe.
3.1. System setup
We implement and test WiLoVe on android. To ensure that the test results are independent from a certain device,
we test on ﬁve diﬀerent models of Android devices, including Google Nexus One, Nexus S, Galaxy Nexus and
Nexus 7 (model 2012 and 2013). For each role in the system, i.e., the user, the veriﬁer, the attacker and the proxy, a
corresponding android app is developed. The CPSLab in Mcgill University is set as the venue. A CISCO Linksys
WRT310N wireless router is employed as the venue AP.
Two types of venue WiFi conditions, i.e., idle and busy, have been set up. They are described as below.
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Fig. 3: Distribution of test check-ins. 60,285 check-in sessions are sampled. Proxy attacks are from Changsha or Montreal; the venue WiFi
condition can also be either idle or busy. For simplicity, we hide the details of how proxy attacks distribute over diﬀerent venueWiFi conditions.
• Idle. In the idle case, there are no consumptive tasks running within the local WiFi environment, so that the
AP can quickly respond to any of the user applications. We simulate the idle WiFi condition by ensuring
that no other applications rather than our testing apps are using the local WiFi for communication.
• Busy. In the busy case, there are applications imposing heavy load on the AP. We simulate the busy WiFi
condition by deploying two additional computers with full-speed bit-torrent downloading and continuous
large ﬁle transferring between each other, through the venue AP.
We diﬀerentiate the two WiFi conditions because they have diﬀerent local network delays, which will aﬀect the
ﬁnal detection of proxy attacks.
The proxy attacks may be initiated from either Changsha in China or Montreal in Canada. For attacks from
Montreal, the attacker’s location is only two blocks away from the test venue. It is the worst case we can get which
has the smallest proxy delay tp, thus makes Δt and Δtproxy least distinguishable. For attacks from Changsha, the
attacker’s location is far away from the venue, hence a good example of those abusing the location cheating.
The communication path between the attacker and the proxy is illustrated by the solid arrow in Fig. 1b.
3.2. Data sampling
We sample 60 thousand check-in sessions, which are detailed in Fig. 3. These check-ins are uniformly dis-
tributed over two weeks, covering weekdays/weekends and daytime/night. Among these check-ins, about 15% are
proxy attacks. This ratio is considered as the worst case. According to our observation, the real world attack ratio
is much lower. The ﬁve devices play one of the four roles (user, attacker, proxy and veriﬁer) alternatively with uni-
form probability. During the tests, the veriﬁer records Δt and Δtproxy chronologically. For each check-in/attack, the
corresponding device records tdecryption. The test check-ins, either valid ones or proxy attacks, are issued in groups.
Each group consists of 20 continuous check-ins. The time interval within two continuous check-ins is negligible
compared to the interval between groups. The following paragraphs give a short summary of the sampled data.
Δt of valid check-ins. 33,316 valid check-ins under idle Average Δt is 44.5 ms and 55.7 ms respectively, where
about 25% extra delay is introduced in the busy environment.
Δt proxy. The proxy attacks could be initiated from either Changsha or Montreal. Average Δtproxy is 87.6 ms and
486.8 ms respectively. The delay from Changsha is about 5 times of that from Montreal. This result indicates that
the proxy attacks’ delay could vary a lot from place to place.
tdecryption. Recall that tdecryption is the time of decrypting the veriﬁcation message. Its average over the ﬁve kinds
of devices is 5.3 ms. Notice that, while recording tdecryption, all the test devices are commonly used, without any
system optimization such as memory cleanup. Thus the ﬁnal result shows the level of tdecryption in real life. In
Section 3.4, we show that tdecryption at this level can hardly aﬀect the performance of WiLoVe.
3.3. Parameter analysis
After storing the sampled data in the database, we can replay them oﬄine to evaluate the system performance
against proxy attacks over diﬀerent parameters. During the replay, instead of actually recording Tsend and Treceive
and computing Δt, Δt for current check-in is read chronologically from the database. A biased coin is ﬂipped to
decide whether the next check-in should be a valid one or a proxy attack. If it is a valid check-in, the next stored Δt
is read; else if it is a proxy attack, Δt of all the subsequent valid check-ins (until a proxy attack is encountered) are
read, and History is updated correspondingly, then Δtproxy of the next proxy attack is read and replayed as the next
check-in. If the attack detecting algorithm requires a recheck-in, the subsequent Δt or Δtproxy in the same group
is fetched and fed into the algorithm again. This repeats until the check-in is accepted or the maximal number of
recheck-ins is reached. If a valid check-in is replayed but the algorithm returns a denial, it is a false positive, which
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Fig. 4: Changes of FPR and FNR while varying the parameters. In the legend, I=Idle, B=Busy, MTL=Montreal and CHS=Changsha.
Table 1: Impact of parameters on the model performance
(a) Varying range of the parameters
Parameter Range Step Size
len [ 10, 100 ] 10
MaxCount [ 1, 20 ] 1
k [ 1, 5 ] 0.2
(b) Impact on the performance.
Parameter FPR FNR
len ↑ ↓ (for busy environment) –
MaxCount ↑ ↓ (slightly) ↑
k ↑ ↓ ↑
means an honest check-in is misjudged as an attack; else if a proxy attack is replayed but it is accepted, it is a false
negative, which means the algorithm fails to detect the attack. Intuitively, the false positive ratio (FPR) and false
negative ratio (FNR) are deﬁned as:
FPR =
number of false positives
number of honest check-ins sessions
FNR =
number of false negatives
number of proxy attack sessions
There are four possible scenarios, with the local WiFi condition being idle or busy, and the proxy attack from
Montreal or Changsha. Among them, the Busy-Montreal scenario is the most challenging one, in which the valid
check-ins and proxy attacks have the closest mean value of time delay. We vary the parameters, i.e. History
length len, MaxCount of recheck-ins, and the upperbound factor k, as shown in Table. 1a, and run the replay for
all possible combinations of these parameters in all four scenarios to get the FPR and FNR. The best result for the
Busy-Montreal scenario is FPR=1.49% and FNR=4.14%, with len=80, MaxCount=10 and k=1.6.
Furthermore, Fig. 4 shows the result FPR and FNR while we vary only one parameter of the model and keep
the other two constants. In these ﬁgures, continuous curves stand for FPR and discrete markers for FNR. We
summarize the impact of diﬀerent parameters on the defending performance in Table. 1b, where an up arrow “↑”
represents increasing and a down arrow “↓” represents decreasing. During the tests, the parameters are varied
individually. When they work together, they may cancel each other’s eﬀect on the performance. That is why we
test all the combinations of their possible values listed in Table. 1a to ﬁnd the best result.
3.4. Performance
We set up a baseline algorithm to compare with WiLoVe. For the baseline, each check-in’s delay is compared
to a predeﬁned constant (threshold) instead of the upper bound (U). Besides, we ensure WiLoVe and the baseline
have the same number of allowed recheck-ins (MaxCount) in the comparison. They are compared from the fol-
lowing three aspects.
FPR and FNR. For the baseline, we vary the constant threshold in range [1ms, 200ms] with a step size
of 1 ms, and simulate it on the Busy-Montreal scenario. The best result is FPR=3.9% and FNR=4.8% with
threshold=39ms, which is very close to our model. But it is actually unachievable in practice, because the hard-
coded “best” threshold is dependent on the data set. Once being applied to a new WiFi environment, the perfor-
mance of the baseline will degrade drastically. This is demonstrated by the following test.
Applicability to diﬀerent WiFi environments. To test the applicability, we run 7,000 check-in sessions in a
new venue WiFi environment which is completely independent from the previous one, with the same parameters,
i.e. len=80, MaxCount=10, k=1.6 for WiLoVe and threshold=39ms for the baseline. The result is FPR=0 and
FNR=4.52% for WiLoVe, which is good. In contrast, it is FPR=0, FNR=54.7% for the baseline with the same
maximal allowed recheck-ins. This gives strong evidence that WiLoVe has a better applicability over the baseline.
This test shows that WiLoVe can apply well to diﬀerent WiFi environments.
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Impact of diﬀerent devices. Assume that the attacker employs a more powerful equipment, so that the decryp-
tion time tdecryption needed is reduced by 5 ms (which will lead to an average tdecryption≈0 ms, considering that the
average tdecryption is 5.3 ms in our test). In this case, WiLoVe with the same parameters gives a result of FPR=0
and FNR=8.03%, which is not much aﬀected, while the baseline algorithm’s performance dramatically decreased
to FPR=0 and FNR=96.6%. Therefore, we conclude that WiLoVe can tolerate the small diﬀerence of decrypting
time among diﬀerent devices.
3.5. User experience
We evaluate the user experience of WiLoVe from the following three aspects.
User operations. In WiLoVe, the newly integrated veriﬁcations are automatically executed in the backstage
and transparent to the user. All the user operations are the same as in existing LBS systems. Thus current LBS
users can transit to WiLoVe smoothly in terms of user operations.
App latency. The extra app latency of WiLoVe is caused by potential recheck-ins. In the worst case, each
check-in session reaches the maximal number of allowed recheck-ins, which is 20. In the busy WiFi environment,
which has a larger delay for honest check-ins, the expected extra latency in the worst case is 20∗55.7ms≈1.1s. We
observe that, for the Foursquare android client, the waiting time of a single check-in session varies from 1s to more
than 3s, depending on the network state. Thus we conclude that the extra latency in WiLoVe which averages at
about 1s is acceptable.
Power consumption. The user app is only activated upon user requests, thus its power consumption is not an
issue. In contrast, the veriﬁer app needs to run at the backstage all the time, thus its power consumption may be
high. To evaluate this, we consider two extreme cases. In the ﬁrst one, the veriﬁer app processes no incoming
check-in requests, it just keeps listening on the port. A fully charged Nexus S has lasted for an average of 22.4
hours over 10 tests. In the second case, We automate the check-in process and continuously repeat the check-
ins with an interval of two seconds. In this case, a fully charged Nexus S has completed an average of 10,341
continuous check-ins, over 10 tests.
To understand the level of the power consumption, we survey the realworld check-in frequency. We investigate
the famous venues under the shopping category in New York City, recommended by Foursquare5, including Apple
Store, Tiﬀany & Co., Macy’s etc. The highest number of historical check-ins is under 150,000. Amortize that over
years, the number of average daily check-ins is only several hundred. Furthermore, for an usual store, the number
will be much smaller due to less daily customers. Compare it with the 10,341 average check-ins processed with
one full charge, we believe that the veriﬁer app’s power consumption is at a reasonable level.
4. Related Work
Many eﬀorts have been made to realize a practical and eﬃcient location veriﬁcation. However, most of them
requires additional hardware. For example, N. Sastry et al. apply ultrasonic techniques to decide the distance6;
Jack Brassil et al. propose to authenticate the user’s location with voice signatures, which needs additional femto-
cell to monitor the traﬃc variation during a voice call7; B. Carbunar and R. Potharaju4 implement FES (Feed-back
enabled embedded system) which requires extra LCD screen to show QR code for veriﬁcation.
Another part of researches can not deal with proxy attacks. For example, Wanying Luo and Urs Hengartner
propose six design goals for location veriﬁcation and demonstrate with cryptographic techniques, but none of the
goals consider defending proxy attacks8.
Some existing studies impose extra operations on the users, thus are less practical. K. Zhang et al. use challenge-
response to verify users9; The aforementioned FES requires the user to scan QR code; WES (WiFi-enabled em-
bedded system) from that same paper requires the WiFi router to dynamically change its SSID, which will force
local users to reconﬁgure for reconnection.
Veriﬁcation systems based on the communication latency exist before this paper. B. Carbunar and R. Potharaju
adopt similar idea as us by detecting abnormal communication delay4. However, they only brieﬂy suggest that
the diﬀerence of delay between valid check-in and proxy attack is highly distinguishable. This is not true, as we
already show in the evaluation that such diﬀerence could be small (scenario of busy WiFi with attacks from Mon-
treal) and hard to be detected. B. Waters and E. Felton also employ the round-trip latency to measure the distance
between user devices and the AP10. In their application, the round-trip time is required to be highly precise for
accurate ranging. In contrast, our goal is only to verify whether the user device is inside the wiﬁ coverage, which
is much more loose. Thus, our dynamic proxy detecting algorithm ﬁts better to the problem. S. Capkun et al. also
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propose the idea of measuring round-trip latency11. However, their solution requires at least one additional base
station (AP in our context) which is invisible to the user. Such invisible AP can only be used for veriﬁcation, thus
will become a burden for the venue owners.
K. Zhang et al. propose to exam the RSS (Received Signal Strength) ﬁngerprint of diﬀerent locations for
veriﬁcation12. The disadvantage of this mechanism is the “cold start” problem, because the server has no RSS
information about any location at the beginning. It also cannot defend proxy attacks. They also propose to use
the honeypot strategy9, which is only eﬀective against cheaters who are blindly cheating around to gain as much
virtual awards as possible, but will fail when attackers have clear targets.
A few studies carry out veriﬁcation based on the location proof concept13,14,15,16. These approaches either need
to push customized code onto the AP, for which most of the oﬀ-the-shelf products need to be hacked, or have a
minimum number of required “witnesses”, which is diﬃcult for venues with small user traﬃc.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose WiLoVe which employs the WiFi coverage to verify LBS check-ins. The venue owner
acts as the veriﬁer, which is implemented on his WiFi-connected device, such as a laptop or smart phone. We prove
that WiLoVe is eﬀective against replay attack, and by utilizing an adaptive algorithm, it also achieves to defend
against proxy attacks, and reaches a best FPR of 3.9% and FNR of 4.8% over 60 thousand check-ins. WiLoVe also
has good applicability to diﬀerent WiFi environments, while keeping consistent user experience and acceptable
power consumption.
Inevitably, WiLoVe has its deﬁciency. It can only be applied to venues with WiFi. Thus it will act more like
an optional security-enhanced strategy in WiFi enabled venues. This makes sense because most of those venue
owners who provides coupons and discounts through LBS are proﬁcient with Internet hence have WiFi service in
their stores. Furthermore, they have strong needs of check-in security. How to seamlessly integrate WiLoVe with
the existing check-in system and make them work accordingly to diﬀerent needs remain as our future work.
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